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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Toward A Jurisprudential Theory of
International Law: Directions for Future
Thought
With the development of the European Economic Community
and other international organizations formed for similar purposes,
international law has reached a new level of sophistication. This
article will examine the philosophical bases underlying interna-
tional law stemming from the two traditional theories of jurisprud-
ence-legal positivism and legal naturalism. It will be argued that
neither theory can account for modern developments in interna-
tional law and that the current state of legal theory has been sur-
passed by legal practice.
Each of the traditional theories includes, as a central compo-
nent, an explanation of legal validity. The concept of legal validity
can be partly explained in terms of obligatory obedience. To say
that a particular rule of law is valid is to say, either directly or by
implication, that there is a prima facie reason to obey that rule. An
explanation of legal validity has traditionally been the cornerstone
of a theoretical explanation of the existence and operation of law.
This article will, therefore, focus on the positivist and naturalist
theories of legal validity and their resulting explanations of the
existence and operation of international law.
I. THE PosrrvsT AccouNT
For the legal positivist, the essential criterion of validity is pedi-
gree. This is to say, if a rule has been properly created, then that
law is valid; otherwise, it is invalid. The positivist looks to the
method by which the rule came into being, not to its content. Thus,
for the positivist, the content of a rule is irrelevant to any determi-
nation of validity, at least insofar as the content has no bearing on
the legitimacy of the creation of the rule.'
A brief examination of the leading modern positivist accounts
of validity will be helpful in understanding the problem that inter-
1. For a more detailed account of both the history and operation of positivist jurisprud-
ence, see, e.g., W. FRiEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY (5th ed. 1967).
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Ann.
national law presents to orthodox positivism. The views to be exam-
ined are those of Hans Kelsen2 and H. L. A. Hart.'
For Kelsen, a legal order is to be understood in terms of what
it accomplishes and the means by which it is accomplished. A legal
order is a complete legal system. Briefly stated, a legal order regu-
lates the behavior of human beings in order to provide a collective
security for those subject to that order through the issuance of
norms (i.e., rules). Additionally, a legal order is to be thought of as
a coercive social order which is, at least potentially, internally con-
sistent and, arguably, effective or, minimally, recognized by those
subject to it. These individual elements of any legal order will be
considered individually and their interdependence will be demon-
strated.
The primary element of any legal order, for Kelsen, is the norm.
That any human activity is legal or illegal is determined by refer-
ence to a norm and not to any mere physical phenomena. As Kelsen
puts it:
What turns this event into a legal or illegal act is not its physical
existence, determined by the laws of causality prevailing in nature,
but the objective meaning resulting from its interpretation. The
specifically legal meaning of this act is derived from a "norm"
whose content refers to the act; this norm confers legal meaning
to the act, so that it may be interpreted according to this norm.'
There are two significant points which may be suggested by this
passage. The first is that, for Kelsen, there can be no meaningful
discussion of the legal status of any act outside of a system. Kelsen
would maintain that all laws are positive laws. The second, and
possibly misunderstood, point is that the existence of a set of norms
is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for there to be a legal
order.
Keeping in mind that one goal of any legal order is to provide
for collective security, it seems appropriate that there be some
means of encouraging adherence to the behavior directed by the
norms of any legal order. Kelsen maintains that each norm is to be
construed as a hypothetical proposition, the antecedent of which
describes the proscribed behavior and the consequent of which au-
2. Kelsen's views as presented in H. KELSEN, THE PuRE THEORY OF LAw (M. Knight trans.
1967) are the bases for the position attributed to him in this paper.
3. Hart's views as presented in H. HAr, THE CONCEPT OF LAw (1961) form the bases
for the position attributed to him in this paper.
4. H. KELSEN, supra note 2, at 3-4.
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thorizes, upon appropriate proof, the administration of a sanction,
by the proper official, to whichever subjects of the system in ques-
tion engage in the proscribed activity. Consider the following ordi-
nary prohibition:
No smoking.
Such a prohibition is to be interpreted as: If x smokes (in the pro-
scribed place), then y ought to impose a sanction on x (where x is
some subject of the appropriate legal order and y is an appropriate
official of that same order).
Thus far, then, Kelsen would maintain that a legal order might
be considered as a set of norms which are "backed up" by threats
of an imposed sanction (i.e., a legal order is a coercive order). How-
ever, such a characterization still does not represent a set of suffi-
cient conditions for some order to be a legal order, in that this
characterization allows or, perhaps, requires that a highwayman's
demand for his victim's valuables, if supported by a threat, be char-
acterized as a special norm and, thus, as part of a legal order.
The significance of the preceding example is not only that there
are certain situations in which one's intuitions direct that some
conclusion is incorrect, but also that a system cannot be judged to
be a legal order simply on the basis of the behavior of those subject
to that system. If an outside spectator merely noticed that a set of
norms were, for the most part, observed, such a spectator could not
legitimately conclude that he had witnessed the functioning of a
legal order. Of course, the effectiveness of a legal order (i.e., that the
norms of that order are, for the most part, obeyed) is crucial to
Kelsen. As he says in his discussion of legitimacy and validity:
A constitution is "effective" if the norms created in conformity
with it are by and large applied and obeyed. As soon as the old
constitution loses its effectiveness and the new one has become
effective, the acts that appear with the subjective meaning of cre-
ating or applying legal norms are no longer interpreted by presup-
posing the old basic norm, but by presupposing the new one ...
The principle applied here is the principle of effectiveness. The
principle of legitimacy is limited by the principle of effectiveness-
Just as the norm (according to which something ought to be)
as the meaning of an act is not identical with the act (which
5. Id. at 210-11. It should be pointed out that, although Kelsen's distinction between the
objective and subjective meanings of acts is certainly not without merit, it is beyond the scope
of this paper to give this distinction the attention it deserves.
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actually is), in the same way is the validity of a legal norm not
identical with its effectiveness; the effectiveness of a legal order as
a whole and the effectiveness of a single legal norm are-just as the
norm-creating act-the condition for the validity; effectiveness is
the condition in the sense that a legal order as a whole, and a single
legal norm, can no longer be regarded as valid when they cease to
be effective.'
The relevant import here is that an alleged legal order, to be a legal
order, must be generally effective. Again, however, effectiveness is
only a necessary condition for an order's being a legal order.
Once the previously discussed criteria (the existence of norms,
the possibility of the imposition of sanctions, and the effectiveness
of those norms) have been satisfied, there remains an additional
essential property of any legal order-the validity of the norms of a
legal order. As Kelsen puts it, "[a] legal norm is not valid because
it has a certain content, that is, because its content is logically
deducible from a presupposed basic norm, but because it is created
in a certain way-ultimately in a way determined by a presupposed
basic norm.' ' There are three significant points suggested by this
passage. First, validity of any norm within a system is not a function
of the content of that norm. Second, there can be no question re-
garding the validity of a legal order-it is a norm which is valid or
invalid, and not a legal order. Third, validity is a system-relative
concept. This means that there can be no question of a single norm's
validity outside any order.
A norm is said to be valid within a legal order just in case that
norm was created by some individual or group which has been
granted the authority to create norms. "Only a competent authority
can create valid norms; and such competence can only be based on
a norm that authorizes the issuing of norms."' Given this account
of validity, it might appear that a vicious infinite regress of norms
results. While Kelsen does describe a hierarchy of norms, the infi-
nite regress is apparently avoided by the introduction of the notion
of the basic norm. For any legal order, there will be one norm whose
validity does not depend upon the authorization of some higher
norm. The validity of this unauthorized norm is presupposed. The
basic norm essentially authorizes the creation of other norms:
6. Id. at 211-12.
7. Id. at 198.
8. Id. at 194.
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For the basic norm is limited to authorize a norm-creating author-
ity, it is a rule according to which the norms of this system ought
to be created. . . . [A] basic norm is presupposed to be valid
which authorizes this way of creating norms. . . . The basic norm
supplies only the reason for the validity, but not at the same time
the content of the norms constituting the system.'
While, as can be seen from this passage, the basic norm of any
system does not provide the content of any lower norms, the basic
norm must not be thought of as merely a locus of ignition for a legal
order. In addition to providing a starting point for a legal order, the
basic norm serves as the unifying principle within any legal order.
Any apparent conflict among norms can be ultimately resolved by
an appeal along the hierarchy to the basic norm. The basic norm,
then, serves a dual capacity-it provides the impetus for a legal
order and it serves to unify a consistent system.10
As does Kelsen, Hart treats legal systems as social systems.
However, the former are to be distinguished from any social system
in that legal systems must include, not only rules stating obliga-
tions, but also rules whose subject-matter includes the rules which
state the obligations-in Hart's terms, a union of primary rules and
secondary rules. To sufficiently appreciate these notions and the
need for such a distinction, a brief account of Hart's thought, both
on the nature of a legal system and on the proper perspectives for
viewing any purported legal system, will prove beneficial.
Hart, in his discussion of the positive contributions of various
natural law theories," suggests that social systems, for the most
part, are initiated for the purpose of establishing a relatively secure
environment for those persons who are subject to such a system.
This can be seen by examining the following five factual presupposi-
tions. The first presupposition is that human beings are vulnerable
to physical injury. The second presupposition is that persons are
so made that it is extremely unlikely that one person will sustain
dominion over others for any more than a short period of time.' :, The
third presupposition maintains that persons can be characterized as
lying somewhere on the continuum which has devils and angels at
either extreme.' The fourth presupposition states that there are
9. Id. at 197.
10. Id. at 221-78.
11. HAfrr, supra note 3, ch. IX.
12. Id. at 190.
13. Id. at 190-91.
14. Id. at 191-92.
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desired and necessary (for survival) objects whose supply is not
unlimited. 5 The final presupposition maintains that human beings
are neither omniscient nor immune from what Aristotle termed
akrasia, or weakness of the will.
Granting these factual presuppositions, any legal system must
provide a framework within which the goal of collective security and
survival may be attained. Since these are factual presuppositions,
it must be kept in mind that they describe situations which are
subject to change; hence, a legal system, if it is to contribute effi-
ciently to the attainment of the desired end, must not be static (i.e.,
the system must provide a means for dynamism as factual situa-
tions are altered). Additionally, legal systems in particular, must
differ from social systems in general, in that the former will pro-
vide, while the latter need not provide, an effective means of en-
forcement of rules primarily designed to attain the desired ends.
In Chapter V of The Concept of Law,'7 Hart specifically ad-
dresses himself to the differences between a prelegal, or simple so-
cial structure, and a complete legal system. The prelegal structure
is a so-called system with only primary rules (i.e., the only rules are
rules which state the obligations of the persons subject to the struc-
ture). Hart points out three crucial defects in the prelegal structure:
uncertainty, static character and the inefficiency of social pressure
in maintaining conformity to the rules.
A prelegal structure is uncertain because, in borderline cases,
there will be no means available to those subject to it to determine
whether or not there has been a transgression of a primary rule. As
Hart puts it:
Hence if doubts arise as to what the rules are or as to the precise
scope of some given rule, there will be no procedure for settling this
doubt, either by reference to an authoritative text or to an official
whose declarations on this point are authoritative. For, plainly,
such a procedure and the acknowledgement of either authoritative
text or persons involve the existence of rules of a type different
form the rules of obligation or duty which ex hypothesi are all that
the group has."s
As knowledge of the demands of the primary rules is unlikely, a
prelegal structure is likely to be unsuccessful in attaining the goals
discussed above.
15. Id. at 192-93.
16. Id. at 193.
17. Id. at 77-96.
18. Id. at 90.
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A prelegal structure has a static character in that rules can only
change through the process of change-in-custom-there being no
authorized body to legislate, there can be no rapidly announced
change in rules. Given that factual situations change, and such
alteration may require additional or, perhaps, fewer obligations on
the part of the subjects of the structure, the prelegal condition is
inadequate in that it may not have the capacity for the introduction
of necessary immediate change.
The prelegal condition would be inefficient in the sense that
enforcement of the primary rules would not be centralized and, most
likely, would not be certain. "It is obvious that the waste of time
involved in the group's unorganized efforts to catch and punish
offenders, and the smouldering vendetta which may result from self
help in the absence of an official monopoly of 'sanctions', may be
serious."" The point here is that such an inefficient allocation of
resources would hamper the attainment of the desired ends for
which any legal system should serve as a means.
Hart introduces the notion of a secondary rule as a remedy to
these three crucial defects in the prelegal condition. Such rules, and
the distinction between them and primary rules, are characterized
by Hart in the following passage:
Though the remedies consist in the introduction of rules which are
certainly different from each other, as well as from the primary
rules of obligation which they supplement, they have important
features in common and are connected in various ways. Thus they
may all be said to be on a different level from the primary rules,
for they are all about such rules; in the sense that while primary
rules are concerned with the actions that individuals must or must
not do, these secondary rules are all concerned with the primary
rules themselves. They specify the ways in which the primary rules
may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied,
and the fact of their violations conclusively determined.2"
Hart introduces a different secondary rule for each of the aforemen-
tioned deficiencies. To remedy the problem of uncertainty, the rule
of recognition is suggested. A rule of this type serves the purpose of
conclusively identifying the primary rules. As Hart puts it, in refer-
ring to a possible historical introduction of a rule of recognition:
[W]hat is crucial is the acknowledgement of reference to the writ-
ing or inscription as authoritative, i.e., as the proper way of dispos-
19. Id. at 91.
20. Id. at 91-92.
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ing of doubts as to the existence of the rule. Where there is such
an acknowledgment there is a very simple form of secondary rule:
a rule for conclusive identification of the primary rules of obliga-
tion."
As remedies for the defects of the static character of the system and
its inefficiency, Hart proposes rules of change-rules which em-
power an individual or group thereof to create primary rules of obli-
gation-and rules of adjudication-rules which authorize individu-
als or groups to determine if a transgression has occurred.
While Hart rightly maintains that primary rules and secondary
rules are of different orders, it must also be pointed out that not all
secondary rules are of the same order. As can be seen, in order to
determine what the rules of change and rules of adjudication are,
rules of recognition must be employed. Though never explicitly dis-
tinguishing the possible order-differences among secondary rules,
Hart's notions of supreme criterion and ultimate rule depend upon
such a distinction. These two notions are introduced by Hart in his
discussion of legal validity.
In contrast to Kelsen, who, as has been argued above, = main-
tains that effectiveness is a condition of validity, Hart desires to
exclude what he terms "efficacy" from any discussion of validity.
By "efficacy" Hart means "the fact that a rule of law which requires
certain behaviour is obeyed more often than not."2 This separation
of validity of a rule from its "efficacy" depends, for Hart, upon the
distinction between the internal and external points of view. The
internal point of view is that viewpoint taken from within any sys-
tem. 2' From such a perspective, a rule of law is valid just in case that
rule is accepted as law by the appropriate officials and, also, by the
general citizenry of that system. From the external point of view, a
rule is valid just in case it satisfies the criteria provided by the rule
of recognition of the system which is being viewed.25 Internally
then, validity is a function of attitude, while externally, it is a
function of the criteria set forth by the rule of recognition. Another
way of viewing this distinction is that internal statements express
a feeling of the speaker, while external statements express facts
about the system under consideration. Given this distinction, the
21. Id. at 92.
22. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
23. H. HART, supra note 3, at 100.
24. Id. at 101.
25. Id. at 99-102.
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following passage explains why there is no necessary connection for
Hart between effectiveness and validity:
From the inefficacy of a particular rule, which may or may not
count against its validity, we must distinguish a general disregard
of the rules of the system. This may be so complete in character
and so protracted that we should say, in the case of a new system,
that it had never established itself as the legal system of a given
group, or, in the case of a once-established system, that it had
ceased to be the legal system of the group. In either case, the
normal context or background for making any internal statement
in terms of the rules of the system is absent. In such cases it would
be generally pointless either to assess the rights and duties of par-
ticular persons by reference to the primary rules of a system or to
assess the validity of any of its rules by reference to its rules of
recognition."
The notion of validity is, then, perspective-dependent or, in other
words, system-relative.
From both the internal and external perspectives, the rule of
recognition of any system is considered to be ultimate. This notion
requires some unpacking in that it has somewhat different interpre-
tations from either perspective. From the external point of view, the
rule of recognition provides the supreme criterion of validity-a
purely factual matter, as can be seen from the following passage:
We may say that a criterion of legal validity or source of law is
supreme if rules identified by reference to it are still recognized as
rules of the system, even if they conflict with rules identified by
reference to the other criteria, whereas rules identified by reference
to the latter are not so recognized if they conflict with the rules
identified with the rules identified by reference to the supreme
criterion."
From the internal point of view, the rule of recognition is ulti-
mate in that its validity is never questioned. This is not to say that
reasons cannot logically be requested regarding acceptance or rejec-
tion of that rule; rather, it is to say that no legal reasons can be given
regarding that rule's validity, while it does provide such reasons for
the validity of other rules-both primary and secondary.
We only need the word "validity", and commonly only use it, to
answer questions which arise within a system of rules where the
status of a rule as a member of the system depends on its satisfying
26. Id. at 100.
27. Id. at 103.
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certain criteria provided by the rule of recognition. No such ques-
tion can arise as to the validity of the very rule of recognition which
provides the criteria; it can neither be valid nor invalid but is
simply accepted as appropriate for use in this way.2'
What can be seen from the above examination of these two
most influential examples of contemporary positivism is that any
discussion of validity of legal rules presupposes at least three ele-
ments. First, there must be some identifiable system, either within
which, or about which questions of validity can arise. Second, it
must be theoretically possible to construct a principle by appeal to
which answers to questions of validity can be provided. Finally, any
such system must have at its disposal a mechanism by which its
rules may be enforced.
II. THE NATURALIST AccouNT
Opposed to the view of validity taken by the legal positivists is
that position adopted by legal naturalists.30 If it is correct to de-
scribe the essential positivist criterion of validity as internal to any
given system, then the naturalist criterion of validity must be con-
sidered as external to any system. 3' For a naturalist, a rule is valid
just in case that rule conforms to some principle (or set thereof);
and, in contrast to the positivist, that principle of validity is the
same, irrespective of the system under consideration.32
Natural law theory should be distinguished from the view that
a rule's validity is wholly a function of morality. While utilization
of morality as a criterion of validity is one feature of legal natural-
ism, 33 the naturalist position is somewhat more sophisticated. As
one commentator has observed: "Thus, a doctrine that the content
of justice could not be expressed in anything more specific than one
or two general adages would scarcely be one of natural law. '3 In
addition to an appeal to moral principles, legal naturalists would
insist that there is, at least theoretically, a body of law over and
28. Id. at 105-06.
29. While the presentation of the legal naturalist position may appear abbreviated, it
must be kept in mind that the remarks made by the positivists, with respect to the purposes
(and some functions) of legal systems, are relatively similar.
30. This account, as will be seen, is somewhat overstated. Many legal naturalists might
argue that there is one overriding system of law by which any "lower" system's validity is
determined.
31. M. GOLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 33 (1975).
32. Id.
33. Wollheim, Natural Law, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 451 (P. Edwards ed. 1967).
34. Id. at 450-51.
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above any particular system of positive or person-made law. Father
Copleston noted in his discussion of Grotius: "There is a natural
social order, and it is the maintenance of this social order which is
the source of law."- Questions of validity, then, for a legal natural-
ist, are to be answered by a two-step approach. First, the rules
which comprise the natural legal order must be discovered. Second,
the rule, whose validity is in question, must be compared with the
natural rules. If a rule is consistent therewith, then that rule is
valid; otherwise, that rule is invalid. 6
I. THE POSITIVIST PROBLEM
The major problem posed by international law for the legal
positivist is based on a mandatory wait-and-see attitude. Hart
points this out in his discussion of Kelsen's account of international
law when he writes:
It is, therefore, a mistake to suppose that a basic rule or rule of
recognition is a generally necessary condition of the existence of
rules of obligation or "binding" rules. This is not a necessity, but
a luxury, found in advanced social systems whose members not
merely come to accept separate rules piecemeal, but are commit-
ted to the acceptance in advance of general classes of rule, marked
out by general criteria of validity. In the simpler form of society
we must wait and see whether a rule gets accepted or not; in a
system with a basic rule of recognition we can say before a rule is
actually made, that it will be valid if it conforms to the require-
ments of the rule of recognition. 7
While this passage is consistent with the philosophical positivist
tradition of treating philosophical problems "scientifically," it
would appear that international law has been in existence long
enough to provide the necessary data to formulate the basic princi-
ple of validity3 However, Hart is correct in rejecting the formula-
tion of such a principle suggested by Kelsen and his followers.
Kelsen's formulation of the basic norm of international law is
suggested in his discussion of the theoretical validity of treaties:
35. 3 (pt. II) F. COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 143 (1963).
36. For a detailed account of both the development of legal naturalism and several
inherent difficulties associated therewith, see W. FR1EDMANN, supra note 1, at 95-156.
37. H. HART, supra note 3, at 229.
38. In the Western world, there have been international legal problems (identified as
such) since at least the twelfth century. See Sinha, The Anthropocentric Theory of Inter-
national Law as a Basis for Human Rights, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 498 (1978).
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Since this second level, that is, the international law created by
international treaties, rests upon a norm of general customary in-
ternational law (the highest level), the presupposed basic norm of
international law must be a norm which establishes custom consti-
tuted by the mutual behavior of states as law-creating facts."
Hart interprets this to mean that states ought to act as they custom-
arily act." There are two difficulties with this principle of validity:
it begs the question of validity and it cannot account for the fast
pace within which contemporary international law must change.
The principle begs the question of validity by treating any rule of
international law as valid, provided that the rule has been accepted
by some state. Such a principle explains too much; it validates
every rule.
If, on the other hand, emphasis is placed upon the force of
"customary," then there could never be a valid first rule. Addition-
ally, there could be no valid change from what has been previously
accepted and acted upon. There could never be a valid first treaty
because there would have been no prior customary relations among
nations. There could never be any valid change because any change
would also involve a change in custom. The positivist may reply
that with respect to any change there must be a waiting period in
order to determine effectiveness. The problem with this reply is that
it provides no means of predicting the validity of either any pro-
posed changes in relations or of new kinds of relations among na-
tions. Thus, the positivist is, on this analysis, committed to only
retrospective judgments of validity. While the retrospective point of
view may have academic significance, it provides little practical
benefits.
The positivists' problem, then, is that they cannot provide a
theoretical explanation of a relatively new development without,
apparently, engaging in a most obvious sort of bootstrapping."
IV. THE NATURALIST PROBLEM
There are two major objections to legal naturalism's account of
validity which suggest that such a theory, in its current state, can-
not offer an adequate theoretical explanation of the status of inter-
39. H. KELSEN, supra note 2, at 324.
40. H. HAr, supra note 3, at 228.
41. For a social scientific objection to the positivist account of international law, see, e.g.,
Finnegan, Three Models of Science in the Study of International Law, 8 CAL. W. INT'L J. 274
(1978).
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national law. The first objection flows from the claimed necessary
connection between law and morals 2 and the existence and require-
ment of so-called "morally neutral" rules. The second objection
flows from the dynamic aspect of legal systems.
While legal naturalism is more than the simple assertion that
only morally correct rules are valid,'" the validity of any rule de-
pends, to a significant extent, upon its moral content. Yet there are
rules which appear to be morally neutral, if not totally arbitrary.
Rules regarding the requisite number of witnesses to a valid will or
the location of the International Court of Justice, for example, seem
incapable of being justified or rejected strictly on the basis of some
overriding natural principle. The problem which the legal naturalist
must overcome is that legal systems have such rules, and in these
morally neutral areas, there often is conflict between systems. If
legal naturalism were adequate, then, ideally, there would be no
conflict between systems.
The naturalist may reply that there is a need to distinguish
substantive rules from procedural rules and that it is only the former
which are to be governed by the naturalist principle. The rationale
for such a claim is that the procedural rules are merely means for
attaining the goals of the substantive rules. Since there are, usually,
many paths to the same destination, the apparent conflict between
systems regarding procedural rules is of no consequence.
Apart from the practical difficulties inherent in drawing such
a distinction,' the distinction itself points out the essential differ-
ence between legal and moral systems. The significance of that
difference is that appropriate criticism of a legal system is much
broader than appropriate criticism of a moral system. Additionally,
such a distinction appears to lead to the primary-secondary rules
distinction which is an essential element of legal positivism.45
While this first objection, alone, may be surmountable (e.g., by
narrowing the view of legal naturalism to substantive rules only),
coupling it with the second objection appears to defeat legal natu-
ralism. Legal systems are dynamic in that the-rules are constantly
changing: there is both expansion and contraction of their scope. If
legal rules are valid only to the extent that they conform to natural
principles, one would expect that no such change would occur. The
naturalist reply to such an objection must be that no legal system
42. D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRMCISM OF LAW 8 (1977).
43. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and its progeny.
45. See notes 7-21 supra and accompanying text.
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has yet reached the naturalist ideal. While this may be so, the
naturalist conclusion must be that it is theoretically possible to
reach a point where change will be unnecessary. Even setting aside
all pessimism, such a state of affairs appears unlikely.
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS SUGGESTING A MIDDLE THEORY
Since neither the legal positivists nor the legal naturalists ap-
pear able to provide an adequate theoretical account of the exist-
ence of international law, there is a need to look elsewhere for a
conceptual explanation. Fortunately, the groundwork for such an
enterprise has been provided by two recent contributions in the field
of jurisprudence and one in political philosophy. With the publica-
tion of Taking Rights Seriously" and The Moral Criticism of Law, "
and the widespread influence of A Theory of Justice8 within the
legal community, the theoretical framework for a hybridization of
positivism and naturalism has been created.
David A. J. Richards has suggested this hybridization as
methodological natural law theory." The significance of Richards'
approach is that it does not draw the sharp distinction drawn by
positivism between legal and moral criticism of law:
The most striking feature of methodological natural law theory,
constituting a significant departure from traditional conceptions of
the philosophy of law, is its concern with the moral analysis of
concrete legal institutions and issues. Recent philosophy of law has
focused on the abstract conceptual analysis of law and legal no-
tions in general. Such examinations are, of course, important and
useful. But, they are only one part of the proper territory which the
philosophy of law should investigate. Methodological natural law
theory seeks to correct this imbalance of theoretical inquiry by
focusing philosophical analysis on concrete problems where law
and morals systematically interconnect.5'
Richards' approach, then, is to recognize that legal theory is a part-
nership of the positivists' conceptual analysis and the naturalists'
substantive analysis.
This approach appears to be that taken by Ronald Dworkin.' 1
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Hercules, Dworkin's hypothetical ideal judge, reaches decisions in
hard cases on the basis of considerations which, according to a strict
positivist account, are extra-legal.52 Hercules is permitted, if not
required, to reflect upon "the concepts that figure in the justifica-
tion of the institutions of his own community"5 3 in his deliberations.
The contributions of John Rawls to this enterprise can serve as
a starting point for the evaluation of the substance of international
agreements. While much thought is required regarding the applica-
bility of Rawls' "veil of ignorance"5 metaphor to the relationships
among nations, once agreement can be reached as to the appropriate
ontological status nations should be accorded, it appears likely that
conclusions similar to the two principles of justice 5 can be reached
with respect to the guiding principles of international law. The veil
of ignorance is Rawls' account of the hypothetical execution of the
familiar social contract.
The extent to which the recent contributions of Rawls, Dwor-
kin, and Richards bear on international law remains to be seen. No
one has yet extended these theories to the problem. Whether such
extension will avoid the problems encountered by the positivist and
naturalist accounts is, at present, unknown. It is hoped that this
discussion has identified the issues to be addressed and will encour-
age future discussion. Finally, it is hoped that such a discussion will
result in the establishment of a set of principles upon which a com-
prehensive jurisprudential theory of international law can be based.
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